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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Does the Necessary and Proper Clause provide an independent and
sufficient grant of power that can authorize the imposition of the
individual mandate?

x

STATEMENT OF AMICI INTERESTS
Amici are experienced constitutional scholars and recognized
authorities on the Necessary and Proper Clause. They are coauthors of
the only book devoted entirely to the subject—The Origins of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, published by Cambridge University Press
in 2010. Some of their other scholarship on the Clause is cited in the
brief.
Gary Lawson is Professor of Law at Boston University. Robert G.
Natelson is retired from his position as Professor of Law at the
University of Montana, and is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies
at the Independence Institute. Guy I. Seidman is Professor of Law at
the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel.
The Independence Institute is a public policy research organization
created in 1984, and founded on the eternal truths of the Declaration of
Independence. The Independence Institute has participated as an
amicus or party in many constitutional cases in federal and state
courts.

xi

Counsel for the parties have consented to the filing of this brief.1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Necessary and Proper Clause was one of a large family of similar
clauses commonly appearing in eighteenth-century legal instruments
delegating authority from one party to another. Those clauses followed
several possible formulae. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a
specimen of the most restrictive of those formulae: It does not actually
grant additional authority beyond that conveyed by other enumerated
powers. Rather, it is a recital, designed to inform the reader of two legal
default rules:
First, that express grants of enumerated powers, stated elsewhere,
carry with them subsidiary incidental powers (“necessary”).
Second, that congressional enactments must comply with standards
of fiduciary obligation and administrative reasonableness (“proper”).

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amici affirm that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other
than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission. The parties have consented to the filing of
this brief.
1

xii

This understanding of the Clause appears in the legal practices and
leading cases at the time the Constitution was adopted, and also in the
history of the Clause itself—the records of its drafting, in the
ratification debates, in the Supreme Court’s great case on the subject,
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), and in Chief Justice John
Marshall’s public explanations of M’Culloch.
Once the meaning of the Clause is understood, the implications for
the individual mandate are clear:
The mandate is not “necessary” because power to impose it is not a
subsidiary “incident” to Congress’s Commerce Power. The power to
compel the purchase of a product is as great or greater than the power
to regulate voluntary commerce; therefore the mandate cannot be an
incidental power regardless of how helpful it might be. For Congress to
possess authority of that kind, it would have to be separately
enumerated in the Constitution.
The mandate is not “proper” because it violates the fiduciary
obligations of impartiality embedded in the word “proper.” During the
debates over ratification, participants recognized that a law chartering
xiii

a commercial monopoly would be “improper.” A fortiori, compelled
purchase from favored oligopolists is improper.
Thus, to the extent that the constitutionality of the individual
mandate depends upon the Necessary and Proper Clause, the mandate
is unconstitutional.

xiv

ARGUMENT
I. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a standard
recital informing the reader that the legal doctrine of
Incidental Powers applies to the Constitution’s
enumerated grants of authority
A. Under founding-era law and practice, when an instrument granted
enumerated powers and then followed the enumeration with a clause
authorizing “necessary” actions in furtherance thereof, the clause was a
mere recital that the doctrine of incidental powers applied to the
instrument.

During the founding era, both the general public and governmental
units made wide use of powers of attorney, trust instruments, corporate
charters, commissions, and other fiduciary documents by which one or
more persons or entities granted power to other persons or entities.
GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, & GUY I.
SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS

OF THE

NECESSARY

AND

PROPER CLAUSE 52-83,

144-76 (2010) (hereinafter “ORIGINS”) (corporate charters and numerous
other instruments). In preparing fiduciary documents, drafters followed
certain conventions and customs. If the instrument listed express
powers but did not by its terms limit the grantee only to the exercise of
1

those express powers (as did the Articles of Confederation),2 the
drafters customarily included one or more general clauses informing the
reader of any further authority conveyed to the grantee.
The scope of that further authority depended on the wording of the
clause. Such clauses fell into at least five separate formulae. ORIGINS at
72-78. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a specimen of the most
restrictive formula from the point of view of powers granted.
Specifically, it restrained the discretion of the power grantee (here,
Congress) more than other formulae, and it required that congressional
laws meet standards of propriety as well as necessity. ORIGINS at 77-78.
(The requirement of propriety is discussed below.) Significantly, in
other parts of the Constitution the Framers opted for clauses following
wider formulae. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §3 (granting the President
power to make such recommendations to Congress as “as he shall judge
necessary and expedient”); U.S. CONST. art. V (granting Congress power

ARTS. OF CONFED. art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled”) (emphasis added).
2

2

to propose amendments whenever it “shall deem it necessary”). But the
Framers did not do so in the case of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
In the eighteenth century, the term “necessary” often signified
incidence. ORIGINS at 61 n.26 (citing many examples). When a legal
instrument conveyed express powers, and then authorized actions
“necessary” to effectuate those powers, the word “necessary” confirmed
that the instrument was subject to the prevailing common law doctrine
of incidental powers. The doctrine of incidental powers widened the
strict meaning of words sufficiently to carry out the intent of the parties
to the instrument. For example, express grant of authority to manage a
farm “and take further actions necessary thereto” might add incidental
authority to sell the farm’s crops to the manager’s core responsibility to
oversee operations on the land.
Absent an express declaration to the contrary, the doctrine of
incidental powers was the default rule. Even so, many founding-era
drafters found it helpful to inform readers of the doctrine by recital. As
Lord Coke had explained, such recitals “declare and express to laymen .
. . what the law requires in such cases.” Boroughe’s Case (K.B. 1596) 4
3

Co. Rep. 72b, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1043, 1044-45 (reporter’s commentary).
The doctrine of incidental powers is discussed further below.
B. The drafting history of the Clause also demonstrates its role as a
recital of the incidental powers doctrine
A majority of the delegates to the 1787 federal convention were or
had been practicing lawyers. Many, if not most, of the non-lawyer
delegates also were knowledgeable about law as a result of personal
study, business and professional experience, and government service.
ORIGINS at 85.
Most delegates wanted the new Constitution to grant incidental as
well as express authority to the federal government. They believed that
the failure of the Articles of Confederation to grant Congress such
authority had been a mistake. Among those holding this view was John
Dickinson of Delaware, who had, in addition to his public service, been
a highly prominent practicing lawyer. Dickinson’s outline for a new
Constitution contained a forerunner of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE RECORDS

OF THE

1787, 86, 89 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).

4

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

Actual drafting of the Necessary and Proper Clause was undertaken
by the Committee of Detail. Like Dickinson, four of the five members of
that Committee had prestigious legal backgrounds: Edmund Randolph,
Oliver Ellsworth, John Rutledge, and James Wilson. ORIGINS at 85-86.
The fifth member, Nathaniel Gorham, was a merchant and former
president of Congress, and thus well acquainted with documents by
which agents and other delegates were empowered. Id. at 85.
The first draft of the Clause, extant in Randolph’s handwriting,
expressly referenced the incidental power doctrine as a tool of judicial
interpretation. 2 THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION 144 (Max

Farrrand, ed., 1937) (“all incidents without which the general principles
cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general
principle”).

The

provision

was

replaced

by

one

in

Rutledge’s

handwriting, which substituted the most common legal label for
incidental powers: “necessary.” The new provision read, “a right to
make all Laws necessary to carry the foregoing Powers into Execu-.” Id.
The Committee then added the words “and proper.” After some
polishing, the final result was approved by the Committee and the
5

Convention without significant controversy. Randolph subsequently
confirmed publicly that the word “necessary” was a synonym for
“incidental.” ORIGINS at 88, n.28 (referencing U.S. Attorney General
Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed national
bank).
C. The ratification history of the Clause further demonstrates its role as
a recital of the incidental powers doctrine.
The Clause was much-discussed during the ratification debates. This
was true in part because, for various reasons, the American public
seems to have understood and appreciated fiduciary law to a
considerable degree. Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special
Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law
of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 247-48 (2007) (discussing
the fiduciary knowledge of the eighteenth-century general public and
some reasons for it). That was why, for example, the floor leader of the
Federalists at the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell,
could describe the Constitution as “a great power of attorney” and think
such a characterization would be persuasive. 4 THE DEBATE

6

IN THE

SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS

ON THE

ADOPTION

OF THE

FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 148 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
The leading concerns of “Anti-Federalists” opposing the Constitution
during those debates were that the Constitution granted, or could be
construed to grant, excessive authority to the federal government. They
cited the Necessary and Proper Clause as an example. However, in the
course of their argument, Anti-Federalists persistently misquoted the
Clause as if it followed another of the common formulae for such
clauses—a formula granting wider power. E.g., 13 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 402 (Merrill Jensen,
et al. eds. 1976) (anti-Federalist tract changing “necessary and proper”
to “which the Congress shall think necessary and proper”).
To correct this inaccuracy, leading Federalists—including but not
limited to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton—explained to the
ratifying public that the Clause as actually worded granted no
substantive authority. They pointed out that the Framers inserted the
Clause not as a power grant but merely from an abundance of caution:
It was designed to avoid quibbling disputes about the extent of federal
7

authority and to clarify that the express grants in the Constitution
(unlike those in the Articles of Confederation) should be read to include
recognized, subsidiary means. ORIGINS at 97-108 (citing The Federalist
and many other sources). The Federalists further emphasized that the
legal effect would have been precisely the same if the Necessary and
Proper Clause were not included, and that congressional authority was
limited to the powers otherwise enumerated. Id. Several ratifying
conventions recommended declaratory amendments to cement this
understanding; these declarations were eventually adopted as the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Id. at 113-14 (listing substance of
amendments proposed).
In the most important decision on the Necessary and Proper Clause,
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall
applied the Clause as a recital of the incidental powers doctrine. In
public writings explaining M’Culloch, Marshall explicitly endorsed that
view of the Clause, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE

OF

MCCULLOCH

V.

MARYLAND 166-176 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (quoting Marshall’s

8

language), and emphasized that it granted no additional power. Id. at
176.
In short, the legal background, drafting history, and ratification
history all show that the Clause did not extend congressional authority
beyond those otherwise granted. It merely affirmed the default rule that
the express grants of power in the Constitution included the lesser,
incidental powers necessary and proper to effectuate the express power.

II. To qualify as “Incidental,” a power had to be a
subordinate power of the kind intended to accompany
an express Power
A. To qualify as “incidental,” a power outside the strictest meaning of the
words of the grant had to be of the kind intended by the makers of a
document to accompany the stated powers.
The incidental powers doctrine was an application of wider legal
concepts governing principals and incidents. In the case of the
incidental power doctrine, the express power was the principal and the
implied power the incident or accessory. ORIGINS 60-67.

9

The bedrock obligation of the eighteenth-century fiduciary3 was to
act only within granted authority, as defined by the terms of the
governing instrument. Although the instrument could limit authority
granted only to that within its express terms, e.g., ARTS.

OF

CONFED.,

art. II, in the absence of such specification, the default assumption was
that the express grants carried with them incidental or implied
authority. As William Blackstone wrote, “[a] subject’s grant shall be
construed to include many things, besides what are expressed, if
necessary for the operation of the grant.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *347 (1765-69).
The essential purpose of this rule was to assist the interpreter in
arriving at results consistent with the probable intent of the parties.
ORIGINS at 60-67, 82-83 (citing, among other sources, Chief Justice
Marshall).
Because the Necessary and Proper Clause was drafted and ratified in
the late eighteenth century, we discuss here only those principles
applied during the founding era. In general, however, the underlying
principles of founding-era fiduciary law were similar to those of
fiduciary law today. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review
of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the
Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007)
(describing eighteenth-century fiduciary principles).
3

10

B. To qualify as incidental to an express power, an unstated power had
to be less valuable than, or subordinate to, it.

An incident was “a thing necessarily depending upon, appertaining
to, or following another thing that is more worthy or principal.” GILES
JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782) (unpaginated). To qualify
as an incident,
an interest had to be less important or less valuable than its
principal. The term “merely” was often applied to incidents,
as was the word “only.” An incident was always
subordinated to or dependent on the principal. The courts
sometimes phrased the latter requirement by stating that an
incident could not comprise a subject matter independent of
its principal nor could it change the nature of the grant.
ORIGINS at 61-62.
For example, authority to manage lands might carry incidental
authority to make short-term leases but not to sell a portion of the fee.
The power to sell was independent of, or as “worthy” as, the power to
manage. 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT

11

OF THE

LAW 235-36

(5th ed. Dublin, John Exshaw 1786), 3 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 538-40 (1742).4
C. To qualify as “incidental” to an express power, a subsidiary power
also had to be so connected to its principal by custom or necessity as to
justify inferring that the parties intended the subsidiary to accompany
the express power.
Being dependent upon or inferior to a principal was a precondition to
qualifying as an incident, but was not sufficient. As is illustrated by the
above-quoted passages from Blackstone’s Commentaries and Giles
Jacobs’ widely-used A New Law Dictionary, an additional requirement
was necessity. The term “necessity,” in this context, was well understood
as a term of art. It referred to either of two situations. First, a power
could be “necessary” by reason of factual necessity. Thus, it was
potentially incidental if either indispensable to the use of the principal
(e.g., The King v. Richardson (K.B. 1757) 2 Keny. 85, 119, 96 Eng. Rep.
1115, 1127) or so valuable to the principal that without it the principal

Bacon’s Abridgment was a digest, first published early in the
eighteenth-century and periodically republished. It was highly popular
during the founding era and has been cited in 55 Supreme Court cases,
most recently in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120,
2125 (2001). Viner’s Abridgment (written by the man who arranged for
4

12

would

have

little

value.

Strong

necessity

falling

short

of

indispensability sometimes was described by saying that absence of
connection between two powers would lead to “great prejudice.” 3
MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT

OF THE

LAW *406 (1786). For

example, fish (personal property) are not absolutely necessary to the
existence of the pond containing them (real property), but “they are so
annexed to and so necessary to the well-being of the [real-property]
inheritance, that they shall accompany the land wherever it vests . . . .”
2 BLACKSTONE, at *427-28.
In addition to factual necessity, pre-existing custom could serve as a
form of fictional “necessity”—and therefore of incidence. For example, a
factor (broker) enjoyed subsidiary power to extend credit if a broker of
that kind customarily received that power. See Anonymous (K.B. 1701)
12 Mod. 514, 88 Eng. Rep. 1487.
Both customary and factual “necessity” made good sense, since they
pointed toward the probable or constructive intent of the parties to the
grant.
William Blackstone’s academic appointment) was the largest digest of
the time.
13

III. The individual mandate is not a “Necessary” law
for executing the Commerce Power because it is not
incidental to the regulation of commerce.
The Founding-Era history of the Necessary and Proper Clause
demonstrates that to be truly incidental the regulation must be of the
kind authorized by an intent-based construction of the instrument even
in the absence of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This, in turn,
requires as a threshold matter that the power be subsidiary to (less
“worthy” than) the enumerated power. If that requirement is met, then
the power is incidental only if it accompanies the principal power by
virtue of custom or is necessary in fact. Supra at Part II.
It is clear that the individual mandate is neither a customary
concomitant to the federal regulation of commerce (it is unprecedented)
nor necessary in fact (as long-standing state health care regulations
demonstrate). But there is no need to examine those questions because
the individual mandate does not even meet the threshold test of
subsidiarity.
The authority claimed by the government in this case—to compel
private citizens to purchase approved products from other, designated
14

private persons—can be subsidiary to nothing. It is a power awesome in
scope. Because such a power is more, not less, substantial than the
power to regulate commerce, it cannot be incidental to the Commerce
Clause.5
Consider an analogy: If one were to grant a power of attorney to a
person to manage an apartment building, it could not be safely assumed
(in absence of specific language) that the building manager also

The Supreme Court’s modern cases upholding extensive regulation
over economic matters generally rely, implicitly or explicitly, on the
“necessary and proper” component of the commerce power rather than
on the core express power to “regulate Commerce.” See, e.g., Ashcroft v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 125, 63 S.Ct. 82, 89 (1942). In fact, the Court has not greatly
altered the fairly narrow definition of the core power that prevailed at
the Founding. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); Randy E. Barnett, New
Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 847 (2003); Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce”
In the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 836-39 (2006) (all
finding that “to regulate commerce” meant only to govern mercantile
trade and certain closely-related activities). Therefore, a law claimed to
be “incidental” to the regulation of commerce must be compared for
“worthiness” with the scope of the core express power, not with
“necessary and proper” economic regulation generally. To do otherwise
would be to pile incidence upon incidence.
For this reason, the Court has developed tests to determine whether
a law outside the core power is truly incidental to regulating commerce.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)
5

15

received authority to sell the building. Because the power to sell a fee is
not “less worthy” or less substantial than the power to manage, it
cannot be incidental thereto. Thus, if a property owner also wishes to
convey authority to sell, the authorizing instrument should so specify.
Similarly, if the Founders wished to grant Congress sweeping
authority to compel all private citizens to do business with any other
private persons, the Founders surely would have referred to it in the
document.
M’Culloch confirms this analysis—that is, the need to determine,
before addressing other aspects of necessity, whether authority claimed
as incidental really is of an inferior or subsidiary character. In
M’Culloch, the Court held that incorporation of a bank was a “necessary
and proper” means for executing the principal powers to tax, borrow,
regulate commerce, and maintain a military. However, the Court was
careful to explain that incorporation was “not, like the power of making
war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive
and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other
(requiring that the law address economic activity that substantially
affects commerce).
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powers.” 17 U.S. at 417. Instead, incorporation “must be considered as a
means not less usual, not of higher dignity, not more requiring a
particular specification than other means . . . .”Id. at 421. Of course, it
was not sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the Bank that the
power to incorporate was of this lesser dignity. Incorporation also had to
be “necessary and proper” for executing federal power. However, its
lesser character was, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized, a threshold
requirement before inquiry could proceed on the questions of necessity
and propriety. If the power to incorporate was as substantial as the
principal powers, it would not matter how helpful or customary the
bank might be.6
M’Culloch is sometimes misunderstood as authorizing more than it
authorized because it stated that subsidiary means may be upheld
under the Necessary and Proper Clause if they are “convenient,” 17 U.S.
at 413, or “appropriate,” id. at 421, for executing express powers.
However, both adjectives had distinctly narrower meanings when
Marshall wrote than they do today. “Convenient” meant only “Fit;
suitable; proper; well-adapted,” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (multiple editions, upaginated); see also, THOMAS
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1789)
(unpaginated) (defining “convenient” as “Fit, suitable, proper”), and as
Chief Justice Marshall himself noted, MARSHALL, DEFENSE, supra, at
106, “appropriate” signified “peculiar,” “consigned to some particular
use or person,”—“belonging peculiarly.” See also JOHNSON, supra
(defining “peculiar” as “appropriate; belonging to anyone with exclusion
6
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If there were any doubt on this point, Marshall himself resolved it
later the same year, when explaining M’Culloch to the general public.
He specifically accepted, as a test of incidence, the requirement that an
incident be less “worthy” than the enumerated powers it supported.
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND at 171.
It is true that in rare cases, the Constitution authorizes, as incidents
of enumerated powers, citizen participation requirements: jury service,
military conscription, and eminent domain on payment of just
compensation. However, those all are cases—like the power to tax—in
which the citizen is required to enter a relationship with his or her
government. All were, moreover, sovereign prerogatives recognized as
such during the founding era. An unprecedented mandate requiring
citizens to purchase a product from favored suppliers is quite another
matter.
The individual mandate simply cannot quality as an incident of
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce.”

of others” and “Not common to other things” and “Particular, single”);
cf. SHERIDAN, (defining “appropriate” as “peculiar, consigned to some
18

IV. The Necessary and Proper Clause also serves as a
recital informing the reader that laws are subject to
fiduciary constraints.
In addition to being “necessary,” congressional enactments under the
Necessary and Proper Clause must be “proper.” That propriety was a
separate requirement from necessity is confirmed by the decision of the
Committee of Detail to add “proper” separately and at a later time than
it inserted “necessary,” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 144, and by a wealth of other textual, structural, and historical
evidence. Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper”
Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
235, 249-55 (2005).
A law is “proper” within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause only if the law conforms with the fiduciary norms of public
trust—that is, with such duties as impartiality, good faith, and due
care, and the duty to remain within the scope of granted authority.
There are several reasons for believing this to be so.

particular”).
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First, during the founding era, in the context of governmental power,
the word “proper” often was used to describe actions peculiarly within
the jurisdiction of the actor. Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). Moreover, during the federal
convention,

“proper”

and

“propriety”

very

frequently

denoted

compliance with fiduciary obligations of various kinds, while breaches
of such obligations were described as “improper.” ORIGINS at 89-91
(citing numerous examples). Ratification-era discussion included
similar characteristics, with suggestions that laws violating the
fiduciary obligations of Congress would be “improper,” and therefore
unconstitutional. Id. at 108-09.
Furthermore, the Constitution was seen as a kind of corporate
charter—not surprisingly so, since founding-era corporate charters were
often public or quasi-public instruments. ORIGINS at 147. Corporate
charters very frequently contained language similar to that of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Although such provisions varied in their
precise language, a scholarly survey of charters has confirmed that the
20

word “proper,” particularly when coupled with “necessary,” described
compliance with fiduciary obligations. Id. at 173-74 (survey of 374
contemporaneous charters).
Finally, the status of the Clause as a recital strongly suggests that
“proper” included the then-prevalent public law rule that grants of
delegated discretionary authority had to be exercised reasonably, even
when that requirement was not spelled out in the grant. This
requirement of reasonableness overlapped with, and may have been
identical to, fiduciary obligations.
The requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated public
power is typically traced to the 1598 decision in Rooke’s Case (C.P.
1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b, 77 Eng. Rep. 209.7 In that case, a statute (23 Hen.
8, c. V, § 3, cl. 3 (1531)) had given sewer commissioners the power to
assess landowners for the costs of repairing water-control projects as
the commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be ordained.” The
commissioner used this statute to assess the full costs of a repair on a

On Rooke’s Case as the foundational authority for the interpretation
of delegated powers, see WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 293-94 (10th ed. 2009).
7
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single landowner, even though other landowners were also benefited by
the project. The court ruled for the assessed landowner because,
notwithstanding the Words of the commission give Authority
to the commissioners to do according to their Discretions, yet
their Proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the
Rule of Reason and law. For Discretion is a Science or
Understanding to discern between Falsity and Truth,
between Wrong and Right, between Shadows and Substance,
between Equity and colourable Glosses and Pretences, and
not to do according to their Wills and private Affections . . . .
5 Co. Rep. at 100b, 77 Eng. Rep. 210.
In other words, discretion, even when textually unlimited, had to be
exercised reasonably and in a disinterested and impartial fashion.
Other decisions applied a similar principle regarding exercise of even
very broadly worded grants of discretion. See Keighley’s Case (C.P.
1709) 10 Co. Rep. 139a, 140a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138 (statute
authorizing sewer commissioner to make rules “after your own wisdoms
and discretions” required the agent to exercise discretion “according to
law and justice”). Still other cases extended the principle beyond sewer
commissions to include all delegated power. See Estwick v. City of
London (K.B. 1647) Style 42, 43, 82 Eng. Rep. 515, 516 (“wheresoever a
commissioner or other person had power given to do a thing at his
22

discretion, it is to be understood of sound discretion, and according to
law” (emphasis added)). This constraint on the exercise of delegated
power, which in England has come to be called the principle of
reasonableness, was firmly established by the end of the seventeenth
century. STANLEY DE SMITH ET AL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 297-98 (5th ed. 1995).
The principle of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated power
was reiterated in 1773 in Leader v. Moxon (C.P. 1781) 2 Bl. W. 924, 96
Eng. Rep 546. Paving commissioners, under a statute giving them
power to pave or repair streets “in such a manner as the commissioners
shall think fit,” ordered a road repair that effectively buried the doors
and windows of plaintiff’s house. In awarding damages to the
homeowner, the court wrote that the agents “had grossly exceeded their
Powers, which must have a reasonable construction. Their Discretion is
not arbitrary, but must be limited by Reason and Law . . . . [H]ad
Parliament intended to demolish or render useless some houses for the
Benefit or Ornament of the rest, it would have given express Powers for
the Purpose, and given an Equivalent for the loss that Individuals
23

might have sustained thereby.” Id. at 2 Bl. W. at 925-26, 96 Eng. Rep.
at 546-47.
These constraints on government discretion were simply part of what
it meant to exercise delegated public power in the founding era.
Accordingly, when the federal Constitution vested “executive Power” in
the President, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and “judicial Power” in the
federal courts, id. art. III, § 1, those grants of power carried with them
the principle of reasonableness as a limitation.
Because the principle of reasonableness in England was an
assumption about Parliament’s intentions in granting power to
executive and judicial agents, the reasonableness principle did not
apply to Parliament itself. One could account for that result in either of
two ways: (1) because Parliament did not exercise delegated power or
(2) because Parliament exercised legislative power and the principle of
reasonableness applied only to executive and judicial power. If the
reason for not applying the principle to Parliament was that Parliament
did not exercise delegated power, then the principle of reasonableness
would apply of its own force to Congress, because Congress under the
24

Constitution, unlike Parliament, does in fact exercise only delegated
power. But if the reason for non-application was that the principle did
not reach legislative power as such, then the principle might only apply
to Congress if there were some specific textual indication that it did so.
The Necessary and Proper Clause is a textual vehicle for making
clear that the principle of reasonableness applies to Congress’s
implementational powers, just as the principle applies of its own force
to the President and the federal courts. It was not open to a drafter in
the late eighteenth century simply to say that “the principle of
reasonableness shall apply to Congress,” because the label, “the
principle of reasonableness,” did not then exist; it is a relatively recent
piece of nomenclature. ORIGINS at 121. Nor was the doctrine sufficiently
well formulated at the time of the framing to be described by any other
readily identifiable label. The contours of the doctrine, however, were
very well described by the phrase “necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution . . . .”
The case law through the eighteenth century applying what later
came to be called the principle of reasonableness established that
25

discretion in governmental actors must be exercised impartially
(Rooke’s Case; Keighley’s Case), with attention to causal efficacy
(Keighley’s Case), in a measured and proportionate fashion (Leader v.
Moxon), and with regard for the rights of affected subjects (Leader v.
Moxon). See ORIGINS at 120, 137-41 (elaborating the substantive
requirements of reasonableness contained in the leading cases). Those
requirements for governmental action are well encapsulated by a
provision stating that laws for executing powers must be “necessary and
proper.” A clause empowering one to act in a “necessary and proper”
manner affirmed that the actor had incidental powers, but only to the
extent exercised in conformance with the full panoply of fiduciary
duties. ORIGINS at 80.
In assessing such evidence, it must be understood that the
generation that wrote and adopted the Constitution viewed government
as properly constrained by obligations of fiduciary trust. Indeed, writers
and speakers sometimes seem obsessed with the idea. Political
discourse was filled with assessments of government rules and actions
according to fiduciary standards. ORIGINS at 52-56; Robert G. Natelson,
26

The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004).
This kind of discussion was prominent at both the federal and state
ratifying conventions. Id. at 1083-86 (citing numerous examples).

V. The individual mandate is not a “Proper” law for
executing the Commerce Power.
As pointed out above, the founders sought to incorporate fiduciary
standards into the Constitution. One way in which they did so was to
require that federal laws be “proper.” This requires, at the least,
compliance with basic fiduciary norms, including fiduciary obligations
and the overlapping, if not identical, requirements of “reasonableness.”8
One of the most basic fiduciary norms is the obligation to treat all
principals with presumptive equality when there is more than one
principal.

In

Keighley’s

Case,

supra,

for

instance,

the

sewer

commissioners could not impose the full costs of projects or repairs on
The government—with no historical or conceptual warrant or
argument—asserts that the individual mandate is “proper” because it
“take[s] into account the societal judgment—reflected in state and
federal law—that denying emergency care because the patient lacks
insurance would be unconscionable.” Brief for Appellants, at 36.
However, as pointed out in this section, the word “proper” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause does not depend on societal judgments
regarding sound policy.
8
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only some of the affected landowners, even when the governing statutes
seemed to provide that discretion. Nor under Leader v. Moxon could the
paving commissioners repair a road by burying one person’s house.
The purpose of the individual mandate is to force people who choose
not to buy insurance to enter the market in order to subsidize other
people. Although Congress could fund an insurance subsidy program for
high-risk individuals through general taxation, the individual mandate
is not a tax but essentially a form of involuntary servitude. It is
analogous to, for example, compelling physicians, under penalty of fine,
to devote fifteen hours per week to providing health care to favored
individuals. It also is analogous to relieving distress in the automobile
industry by compelling citizens to buy cars. Similarly, Congress cannot
use the Necessary and Proper Clause to force one class of citizens to buy
a product to help others (even if Congress can provide that help directly
through other constitutional powers).
Although the individual mandate is unprecedented, the Founders
were familiar with a related, although less intrusive, commercial
regulation: the government-chartered monopoly. When the government
28

chartered a monopoly, it limited the market to one provider—although
unlike the individual mandate, citizens remained free to choose not to
purchase goods or services from the monopolist. Grants of monopolies
were unpopular, since by erecting a system of commercial favoritism
they violated the government’s fiduciary obligation to treat citizens
impartially, and were held to violate common law. Case of Monopolies
(Q.B. 1602) 11 Co. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260.
Leading Founders were split on whether the congressional power to
regulate commerce included authority to establish monopolies. Compare
2 THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787, at 616 (quoting

James Wilson as stating that such authority was included), and at 633
(quoting Elbridge Gerry to like effect) with 616 (quoting George Mason
to the contrary). Yet during the ratification debates, the Constitution’s
advocates asserted that any law creating a monopoly would be invalid
as “improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause. As a Federalist
writer calling himself the “Impartial Citizen” pointed out:
In this case, the laws which Congress can make . . . must not
only be necessary, but proper—So that if those powers cannot
be executed without the aid of a law, granting commercial
monopolies. . . such a law would be manifestly not proper, it
29

would not be warranted by this clause, without absolutely
departing from the usual acceptation of words.
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at 431.
The conclusion is clear: If a commercial monopoly—which citizens
may

avoid

by

not

purchasing

the

product

monopolized—is

constitutionally void as “improper,” then far more “improper” is a
mandate for the benefit of a favored few and that none but a favored
few may avoid.

Conclusion
The decision of the District Court should be affirmed.
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